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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF A 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION, : Case No. 2026 8 
7th District Court No. CS-1 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SUBPOENA POWERS ACT MEETS ALL CONSTI-
TUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF 
INVESTIGATIVE SUBPOENAS 
A. ALLEGED LACK OF JUDICIAL CONTROL 
Respondents maintain in their respective briefs that 
the Subpoena Powers Act permits and even "encourages" abuses of 
fundamental freedoms and that the Act authorizes a criminal 
investigation to proceed without judicial control. 
These assertions are simply without factual support in 
this case. The Act requires that the investigation may not be 
commenced except upon "application and approval of the district 
court, for good cause shown." This requirement, which 
respondents attempt to minimize, clearly mandates initial 
District Court approval for the investigation to begin. 
Following the initial good cause showingf the District 
Court retains control over the progress of the investigation when 
a subpoena or other act of the prosecuting agency is challenged. 
Respondents Thompsonf Conklinf Ziemski and Bowman suggest that 
the Attorney General's interpretation of the statute, "deprives 
the court of all ability to control the scope of the 
investigation or to assure that the investigation proceeds within 
the confines of the initial authorization11. 
This assertion, which is essentially shared by all of 
the respondents, simply does not square with the facts of this 
case nor with what could happen in any other investigations under 
the Act. 
This investigation was initially authorized by Judge 
Bunnell and proceeded until challenged by the respondents. That 
challenge consisted of motions to quash and other motions heard 
by the Court. Some of the motions to quash were granted by the 
District Court. That court was in no essential way deprived of 
the ability to control the scope of the investigation or 
prevented from assuring that the investigation proceed within the 
initial authorization. That control and oversight was the very 
nature of the motions filed by the respondents. The fact that 
respondent's motions were reviewed by the Court and in part 
granted shows that the authorizing Court does retain control over 
the scope of the investigation and that the prosecuting agency 
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cannot conduct an investigation without restriction or judicial 
oversight. Obviously there are remedies to a party who chooses 
to resist a subpoena. But, the fact that the Court granted a 
motion to quash by holding a subpoena overbroad is not sufficient 
reason to hold the act unconstitutional. 
Every evidence gathering procedure from police 
interview to court authorized wiretapping and search warrants are 
subject to potential abuse and thus the ultimate exclusion of 
evidence gathered pursuant to the investigative procedure used. 
The potential that a search warrant may be too broadly drawn or 
that law enforcement officials may search further than authorized 
has never been considered sufficient grounds to hold search 
warrant statutes unconstitutional. 
The remedy for unauthorized police or investigative 
action is suppression of the unlawfully obtained evidence, not 
the invalidation of legislation authorizing the investigation at 
the outset. Clearly, the more reasoned approach is case by case 
analysis not wholesale and unnecessary invalidation. 
An example of this is approach is found in State v. 
Ruggeri. 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969, (Utah, 1967). In that 
case this Court held that when an accused or target is called 
before a grand jury he must be warned of the charges against him 
and failure to do so would be to violate his privilege against 
self-incrimination. This court held that the target of a grand 
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jury investigation must be warned of his targeted status and that 
failure to do so would result in the suppression of the testimony 
elicited from him. 
The grand jury statute in effect at the time of 
Ruggeri, supra, did not require the giving of a target warning, 
yet this Court did not strike down the statute but instead took 
the more reasoned approach and upheld the lower court's 
suppression of the evidence. The Court didn't rule the statute 
unconstitutional because of potential abuse or because in that 
situation the evidence was improperly gathered. 
This is not to suggest that in the present case the 
trial court was correct in its assessment that some of the 
subpoenas were overbroad, but assuming arguendo any violation of 
constitutional rights, the proper remedy is suppression not 
invalidation of the authorizing investigative act. 
Respondents Thompson, Conklin and Ziemski also suggest 
that the court is deprived of an opportunity to review challenged 
subpoenas in light of the investigation as a whole, and a person 
actually accused is deprived of the opportunity to evaluate the 
legality of the procedure followed. These assertions also will 
not stand analysis in that both the authorizing court and the 
court where the evidence is to be introduced may review at length 
the challenged subpoenas and evidence through motions to quash 
and by motions to suppress filed at appropriate times. 
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Additionally, a party may, if charged, file a discovery 
request pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, (U.C.A. § 77-35-16 to obtain the following information 
and discovery: 
77-35-16. Rule 16 — Discovery. (a) 
Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor 
shall disclose to the defense upon request 
the following material or information of 
which he has knowledge: 
(1) Relevant written or recorded 
statements of the defendant or co-defendants; 
(2) The criminal record of the 
defendant; 
(3) Physical evidence seized from the 
defendant or co-defendant; 
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor 
that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, 
or mitigate the degree of the offense for 
reduced punishment; and 
(5) Any other item of evidence which 
the court determines on good cause shown 
should be made available to the defendant in 
order for defendant to adequately prepare his 
defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all 
disclosures as soon as practicable following 
the filing of charges and before the 
defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make 
disclosure. . . . 
For failure to provide this discovery the Court may 
under § 77-35-16 (g) U.C.A. prohibit the prosecution from 
"introducing evidence not disclosed." 
B. POWER OF COURT TO REVIEW SUBPOENAS 
Respondents have also claimed that the power of the 
authorizing Court to review the subpoenas is inadequate or 
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illusory and fails to protect the rights of those under 
investigation. 
Of course, those under investigation in any criminal 
investigation may protect their own rights only through 
themselves, not through others. In SEC, v. Jerry T. O'Brien, 467 
U.S.
 f 81 L.E.2d 615, 104 S.Ct. 2720 (1984), targets of a 
Securities and Exchange investigation brought an action to 
prevent third parties from complying with subpoenas issued by the 
SEC. The United States Supreme Court held that targets of the 
investigation were not entitled to notice of issuance of 
subpoenas to third parties. Thus, a target may not seek 
protection of his rights through third parties, but only as he is 
subpoenaed to provide testimony or documentary evidence. 
Respondents, Thompson, Bowman, Conklin and Ziemski 
suggest that they are denied protection when material is sought 
from third parties. The Supreme Court in O'Brien addressed those 
contentions directly: 
It is established that, when a person 
communicates information to a third party 
even on the understanding that the 
communication is confidential, he cannot 
object if the third party conveys that 
information or records thereof to law 
enforcement authorities. United fftates v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 
1624, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976). Relying on that 
principle, the court has held that a customer 
of a bank cannot challenge on Fourth 
Amendment grounds the admission into evidence 
in a criminal prosecution of financial 
records obtained by the Government from his 
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bank pursuant to allegedly defective 
subpoenas, despite the fact that he was given 
no notice of the subpoenas. J&, at 443, and 
n.5, 96 S.Ct. at 1624, and n.5. See also 
Donaldson v. United Statesf 400 U.S. 517, 
522, 91 S.Ct. 534, 538, 27 L.3d.2d 580 (1971) 
(Internal Revenue summons directed to third 
party does not trench upon any interests 
protected by the Fourth Amendment). These 
rulings disable respondents from arguing that 
notice is subpoenas issued to third parties 
is necessary to allow a target to prevent an 
unconstitutional search or seizure of his 
papers. . . . i£. at 272b. 
The Court also held, 
Two considerations underlie our decision 
on this issue. First, administration of the 
notice requirement advocated by respondents 
would be highly burdensome for both the 
Commission and the courts. The most obvious 
difficulty would involve identification of 
the persons and organizations that should be 
considered "targets" of investigations. The 
SEC often undertakes investigations into 
suspicious securities transactions without 
any knowledge of which of the parties 
involved may have violated the law. To 
notify all potential wrongdoers in such a 
situation of the issuance of each subpoena 
would be virtually impossible. . . . The 
complexity of that task is apparent. Even in 
cases in which the commission could identify 
with reasonable ease the principal targets of 
its inquiry, another problem would arise. In 
such circumstances, a person not considered a 
target by the Commission could contend that 
he deserved that status and therefore should 
be given notice of subpoenas issued to 
others. To assess a claim of this sort, a 
district court would be obliged to conduct 
some kind of hearing to determine the scope 
and thrust of the ongoing investigation. 
Implementation of this new remedy would drain 
the resources of the judiciary as well as the 
Commission. 
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Secondf the imposition of a notice 
requirement on the SEC would substantially 
increase the ability of persons who have 
something to hide to impede legitimate 
investigations by the Commission, . . . Id, 
at 81 L.Ed 626 30. 
Respondents Thompson, Conklin, Bowman and Ziemski cite 
People v, Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755f 290 P.2d 855 (1955) as standing 
for the proposition that a non-subpoenaed individual should be 
able to challenge a subpoena to another and have excluded 
evidence taken from third parties. 
The "Martin" rule as it came to be known was the law in 
California but is not the law federally or in Utah. Further the 
Martin rule was abrogated by Proposition 8 in California and so 
recognized in People v. Daan, 207 Cal. Rptr. 228 (Cal. App., 
1984). 
The court held, 
We hold section 28(d) abrogates 
California's vicarious exclusionary rule, the 
court correctly denied the motion to suppress 
the evidence seized from Bryan and affirm 
Daan's conviction and sentence." Id. at 233. 
The Utah rule was expressed by this Court in State v. 
Purcell. Utah 580 P.2d 441 (1978) where it was held that a 
defendant had no standing to attack the search of a stolen 
automobile in which he had no possession or proprietary interest. 
Most recently in State v. Valdez, No. 18855, Sept. 11, 1984, this 
Court held, 
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We do not reach the question of whether 
this search was permissible under the state 
or federal constitution* Defendant concedes 
that he did not own the car or the attache 
case containing the evidence complained off 
and he has failed to show that he had any 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
effects searched. Under long-established 
precedent, he lacks any standing to complain 
of the resulting search. E.g., State v. 
Purcell. Utahf 586 P.2d 441 (1978); Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
JLsU at p.2 
Thus, respondent's argument falls on two separate 
though related grounds. First, in Utah the accused has no right 
to challenge evidence used against him obtained from a third 
party even if it were obtained illegally and second, assuming 
suppression was a proper remedy, a suppression motion in the 
appropriate court would be the appropriate remedy not wholesale 
invalidation of the Subpoena Powers Act. 
C. EFFECTIVENESS OF PRE-CQMPLIANCE REMEDY 
Each of the Respondents allege that the pre-compliance 
remedy of a motion to quash a subpoena is ineffective because 
neither the subpoenas nor the Act gives notice to witnesses that 
such a remedy is available. The Act does, of course, require 
notice of the right to counsel and counsel is presumed to know 
that any subpoena issued by any authority is subject to a motion 
to quash. Utah Power and Light complains that some witnesses 
can't afford counsel or won't think it is necessary because the 
subpoena appears sanctoned by a court. Such complaints have no 
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place on the faacts of this case, where every witness ever 
subpoenaed was represented by counsel, and did challenge 
subpoenas, thus respondents are again attempting to assert the 
rights of others in circumstances unrelated to this case. 
However, their claims are also meritless. 
It is axiomatic that any witness who voluntarily 
appears and testifies in compliance with a subpoena has waived 
any opportunity to challenge the subpoena. If the witness also 
chooses not to be represented, he has waived that right as well. 
Thus, any witness who voluntarily appears and testifies in 
complaince with a subpoena has waived any opportunity to 
challenge the subpoena. If the witness also chooses not to be 
represented, he has waived that right as well. Thus, any witness 
subpoenaed under the Act knows or should know of the existence of 
a remedy prior to complaince. 
Appellant is aware of no setting in which subpoenas 
issued by courts or by any investigatory body are required to 
warn to subpoenaed individual of the availability of a challenge 
to the subpoena through a motion to quash. Yet such a remedy is 
inherently available in any process in which subpoenas are used. 
See e.g. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F.Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 
1972). Thus, respondents' argument that notice is required to 
make the remedy effective fails, especially in light of the 
procedures followed in this proceeding. 
-10-
D. POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE AND PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS 
Respondents insist that because the potential for abuse 
exists that the Act must fall. This reasoning makes no more 
sense than to urge the invalidation of search warrant or wire 
tapping statutes, where the potential for abuse also exists. 
Respondents also claim that the Subpoena Powers Act is 
deficient in setting forth sufficient procedural safeguards. The 
applicable case in this regard is, as noted in the State's 
Appellant's brief, Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 
U.S. 186 (1946) . 
The standards set forth in Walling, supra, are clearly 
met by the Subpoena Powers Act. Those standards set forth in the 
State's brief are: 
1. The investigation must be for an 
authorized purpose. 
2. The subpoena must seek relevant 
information. 
3. The subpoena must be specific in nature. 
The Subpoena Powers Act by requiring judicial approval 
to commence the investigation and by the inherent right to 
challenge.subpoenas as respondents did in this case, guarantees 
the Walling standards will be met. Respondents challenge the 
"relevance'1 portion of the standard claiming that relevance may 
not constitutionally be determined by the investigating agency at 
the outset. Walling, supis, specifically provides otherwise, 
holding, 
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We think, therefore, that the Courts of 
Appeals were correct in the view that 
Congress has authorized the Administrator, 
rather than the District Courts in the first 
instance, to determine the question of 
coverage in the preliminary investigation of 
possibly existing violations; in doing so to 
exercise his subpoena power for securing 
evidence upon that question, by seeking the 
production of petitioners1 relevant books, 
records and papers; and, in case of refusal 
to obey his subpoena, issued according to the 
statute's authorization, to have the aid of 
the District Court in enforcing it. No 
constitutional provision forbids Congress to 
do this. On the contrary, its authority 
would seem clearly to be comprehended in the 
"necessary and proper" clause, as incidental 
to both its general legislative and its 
investigative powers, ig. at 214. 
. . . 
Persons from whom he seeks relevant 
information are not required to submit to his 
demand, if in any respect it is unreasonable 
or overreaches the authority Congress has 
given. To it they may make "appropriate 
defense" surrounded by every safeguard of 
judicial restraint. 1£. at 217. 
Thus the Supreme Court has held under circumstances 
very similar to those involved in this case that the powers like 
those granted under the Subpoena Powers Act are not 
unconstitutional and the constitutional rights guaranteed all 
citizens are sufficiently protected. Further, the final 
determination of relevance of a challenged subpoena is made by 
the court whenever a subpoena is challenged. Respondents1 point 
misses the mark. 
The Utah legislature, much like the Congress had in 
Walling has declared "as a matter of legislative determination, 
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that it is necessary to grant subpoena powers in aid of criminal 
investigations." § 77-22-1, U.C.A. Respondents suggest that the 
controlling cases in this setting are pannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 
420, 4 L.Ed 2d 1307 (1960) and Jenkins v. McKeithen. 395 U.S. 
411f 23 L.Ed 2d 404 (1969). 
The Hannah case essentially sets forth the standard 
that investigatory proceedings, by an investigatory body, do not 
require that witnesses be informed of specific charges being 
investigated, identity of complainants or the right to cross 
examination. The court held that since the Civil Rights 
Commission, the investigating agency, did not adjudicate rights 
it need not be bound by adjudicatory procedures. 
In Jenkins, supra, the Court held that the procedures 
of a Louisiana commission created to investigate criminal 
violations in the field of labor management violated due process. 
In Jenkins, one of the functions of the Commission was as 
follows: 
The Commission is required to determine, 
in public findings,, whether there is probable 
cause to believe violations of the criminal 
laws have occurred. . . . 
The findings are to be a matter of 
public record. Id at 416, 417. 
The Court further observed, 
[E]verything in the Act points to the 
fact that it is concerned only with exposing 
violations of criminal laws by specific 
individuals. In short, the Commission very 
clearly exercises an accusatory function; it 
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is empowered to be used and allegedly is used 
to JLiajEl named individuals guilty of violating 
the criminal laws of Louisiana and the United 
States and to brand them as criminals in 
public. I&. at 427-428. (emphasis added) 
Comparing the Subpoena Powers Act to the statutory 
scheme disapproved in Jenkins, it is obvious that the Act under 
review by this Courtf does not require or even allow "public 
findings" to be made by those investigating. Nor is the 
investigating agency be it the Attorney General or a county 
attorney required to make probable cause findings as to whether 
the violations of the criminal laws have occurred. Also, despite 
the urging of respondents the Subpoena Powers Act does not 
authorize nor may it be used in an accusatory manner. The Act 
mandates none of the things which the United States Supreme Court 
found objectionable in Jenkins, supra. 
Respondents1 reasoning on this point is extremely 
shallow. They state that prosecutors serve "solely an accusatory 
function "and since the Act allows accumulation of information 
necessary to accusef the investigation must be accusatory. This 
argument misses the mark - no one's rights are adjudicated during 
investigation or even upon charging. When the charge is by 
information a finding of probable cause by a neutral magistrate 
at a preliminary hearing provides protection for the accused. 
The need for the power to investigate criminal activity 
is implicit in the statutory duties of the Attorney General and 
the States 29 county attorneys. 
Section 67-5-1, U.C.A. provides: 
It is the duty of the Attorney General: 
(1) To attend the Supreme Court, and all 
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courts of the United States, a prosecute and 
defend all causes to which the state . . . is 
a party. 
Section 17-18-1, U.C.A. provides: 
The county attorney is a public 
prosecutor, and must: (1) Conduct on behalf 
of the state all prosecutions for public 
offenses committed within his county . • • 
These duties cannot be properly discharged without 
investigation. To be sure that investigation should be within 
constitutional guidelines and with a view to constitutional 
protections. The Subpoena Powers Act permits investigation and 
fully protects the constitutional rights of the citizens of the 
state. 
POINT II. 
THE ACT GRANTING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND 
COUNTY ATTORNEY SUPOENA POWERS IN AID OF 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION IS NOT UNCONSTI-
TUTIONALLY VAGUE OR OVERBROAD 
Respondents Stott, Colby and Maxfield argue that the 
United States Supreme Court's vagueness analysis in ffolender v. 
Lawson. 461 U.S. 352, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (1983), 
should be applied to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-1, 
et seq., (Rev. 1953), as amended. The result they contend is 
that the statute fails constitutionally because it doesn't 
"establish minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement." 
(Stott, Colby, Maxfield, pp. 36-37). The argument is misguided. 
The statute challenged by Edward Lawson, in Kolender, supra, was 
§ 647(e), California Penal Code: 
Every person who commits any of the 
following acts is guilty Qt fliSQEdqrly 
conduct, a misdemeanor: . . . 
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(e) who loiters or wanders upon the 
streets or from place to place without 
apparent reason or business and who refuses 
to identify himself and to account for his 
presence when requested by any peace officer 
so to do, if the surrounding circumstances 
are such as to indicate to a reasonable man 
that the public safety demands such 
identification. (Emphasis added.) 
At issue in Kolenderf supraP was whether the statute, 
like vagrancy statutes before it, see Papachristou v. 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), described with sufficient 
particularity what a suspect must do in order to satisfy the 
statute and avoid committing a crime. fColender, 361. The 
Supreme Court found that it did not. id., 361. In dicta, but 
still in reference to the California Criminal Statute before her, 
Justice O'Connor, observed, as the respondents correctly point 
out, that whenever a legislature, in a penal statute, fails to 
provide minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement in its 
application, the statute will fail for being vague. The 
application addressed refers to when to arrest a person for 
violating a criminal law. This is nothing more than what this 
court has already said about the vagueness standard against which 
statutes describing crimes in Utah must be measured. See State 
v.Packard, 250 P.2d 561 (Utah 1952); Bueller v. Stone, 553 P.2d 
292 (Utah 1975); State v. Haag, 578 P.2d 873 (Utah 1978); State 
v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 (Utah 1979); State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 
1182 (Utah 1981); State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984). 
Kolender and the Utah cases cited above do not address 
themselves to criminal investigations or procedure. They are 
not, therefore, of any use in interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 77-
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22-1, et seq. Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-1, et seq. which does not 
forbid conduct. Neither does it penalize behavior. It is not, 
in short, a penal statute. In merely authorizes the use of a 
certain device in aid of criminal investigations. Generally 
speaking, it does little more than the search warrant provisions 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-1, et seq.; that is, it gives 
law enforcement a tool, with basic instructions on how it can be 
used. The vagueness test suggested by the respondents simply 
doesn't fit these circumstances. 
The argument of Stott, Colby and Maxfield that Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-22-3 is vague, and thus void, because of its 
secrecy provisions, misses the point as well. Again, the statute 
is not a penal statute. The underlying reason for requiring a 
certain degree of specificity in a criminal statute doesn't exist 
insofar as Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-3 is concerned. Because 
§ 77-22-3 does not prescribe conduct or penalize criminal 
behavior a vagueness analysis is inappropriate. A man of common 
intelligence, See State v. Packard, supra, has no need to conform 
his conduct to the requirements of § 77-22-3 to avoid committing 
a crime and being punished for his acts. Whether or not the 
provisions of that section are as clear as they might be or 
whether that section goes too far in accomplishing the 
Legislature's stated purpose in passing Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-1 
et seq., that is, that; 
as a matter of legislative determination 
. . . [it is necessary] . . . to provide a 
method of keeping information gained from 
investigations secret both to protect the 
innocent and to prevent suspects from having 
access to information prior to prosecution 
. . . . 
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are not subjects of relevent inquiry insofar as vagueness is 
concerned. 
The respondents fail to articulate any harm that comes 
from keeping secret what Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-3 allows a court 
to order be kept secret. Respondents are protected if they are 
ever charged with crimes detected as a result of any 
investigation in which section 77-22-1 et seq. was used to gather 
evidence, by discovery as allowed under Rule 16, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and by the affect of disclosure required of 
the prosecution under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
These rights of respondents to discovery and disclosure like so 
many of the others they contend are not specifically guaranteed 
them by the language of the Act exist independent of any statute. 
The sanctions attended upon the prosecution's failure to comply 
with the rules of discovery and disclosure are obvious, specific, 
severe, and effective. They are well known to anyone who 
practices criminal law. Supression of evidence or sanctions 
against its use and the possibile dismissal of an information or 
an indictment if the abuse strikes at the heart of the defense 
are adequate remedies to correct error and keep prosecutors from 
engaging in prosecutorial misconduct. 
The secrecy provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-3 do 
not pose a threat of any kind to the innocent and do not prevent 
one charged with a crime from discovery or having disclosed to 
him information covered by the same secrecy provisions when it is 
critical to him and his defense. Those same provisions do, 
however, prevent witness and evidence tampering and preserve the 
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integrity of an investigation so that culpable parties cannot 
collaborate or concoct stories to confuse, divert or misdirect an 
investigation. See e.g. SEC v. O'Brien, supra. 
As far as the procedural safeguards associated with 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2 are concerned, the statute need not 
restate the Fourth and Fifth amendments to the Constitution nor 
any of the Articles of the Utah Constitution, or the holding in 
Miranda, or any other provision or case establishing a right to 
which a criminal suspect or the target of an investigation is 
constitutionally entitled independent of any statute. Those 
rights can be protected adequately by a trial court on motions to 
supress prior to trial. 
Stott, Colby and Maxfield argue that the provisions of 
section 77-22-1, et seq. ought to be declared unconstitutional on 
their face. That position is merely a reiteration of arguments 
made in other parts of their brief. It builds on the error 
inherent in their analysis of Kolender: their lack of a thorough 
understanding of the real protections enjoyed by those to whom 
subpoenas authorized by section 77-22-1 et seq. might be 
directed; that is, the right to move to quash subpoenas because 
compliance would be unreasonable, or because the subpoenas exceed 
the scope of the authorizing order or cannot for some other valid 
reason compel production or appearance, and the right to seek 
suppression of the evidence obtained through the use of the 
subpoenas if the evidence obtained results in criminal charges 
and if the party asking the court to exclude evidence can show 
standing and harm. It also illustrates their myopic and naive 
view of the role of the criminal prosecutor. 
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KPlentierr suprar as discussed above, has no legitimate 
place in the analysis of Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-1, et seq. The 
void for vagueness doctrine simply does not apply in the case of 
a statute which is not a penal statute. 
The vehicle by which evidence is obtained, be it search 
warrant or investigative subpoena matters little when evidence is 
sought to be suppressed. Indeed evidence obtained by search 
warrant may be much more difficult to suppress than evidence 
collected by subpoena for the very reasons argued by the 
respondents to attempt to show that § 77-22-1, et seq. is 
defective. When a warrant issues, a magistrate has, upon sworn 
submission, already determined that the required probable cause 
for its issuance exists. Defendant clearly has no standing to 
object to the issuance or execution of a search warrant prior to 
issuance or exeuction. The resultint seizure of evidence 
pursuant to a warrant is rarely controvertable. Evidence 
gathered under subpoena, however, may be more vulnerable because 
determining whether compliance is reasonable can be done before 
any evidence is gathered. This process is, despite the 
respondents arguments, an adequate and effective deterrent to any 
possible abuse by the prosecution. 
There is, simply, nothing about the Act that encourages 
a prosecutor to abuse it, given the protections described above. 
A prosecutor who seeks authorization from a court for the purpose 
of using the Subpoena Powers Act to conduct an investigation must 
keep in mind when making the showing required that his subsequent 
acts will be, as they were in this case, subject to close 
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scrutiny. Wild and irresponsible claims, reckless disregard for 
the truth, carelessly drafted affidavits filed in support of the 
request for authority to use the subpoenaes authorized by the 
Act, will be exposed at some time in the process. They are 
likely to be exposed to the first reviewing judge asked to quash 
a subpoena. Every subpoena issued and every item of evidence 
gathered must be reviewed for whether it will withstand a 
defendant's effort to keep it from being used at trial. 
Statements taken from witness and targets must be taken with a 
view to their ultimate utility in any subsequent proceeding. 
Rights warnings and making sure that a witnesses rights are 
observed are the only means a prosecutor has of protecting his 
evidence so that it will have some value to him later on. All of 
this and more the prosecutor and investigator must do in order to 
avoid coming to the end of an investigation and finding 
themselves with information that might point to criminal conduct 
but which is worthless because it is inadmissible as evidence in 
a criminal trial. For a prosecutor or investigator to do less 
than observe the rule scrupulously would be contrary to his own 
interest and would be foolhardy. 
For respondents to assert that prosecutors have a 
"sworn duty to obtain convictions and put people in jail" (Stott, 
Colby and Maxfield brief, p.24, 48) and to say that "in their 
zeal to fulfill this function all of these prosecutors cannot 
reasonably to apply [the Subpoena Powers Act] in a way that 
safeguards Constitutional rights" besides being statements that 
contradict themselves, betrays respondents' ingnorance of the 
-21-
prosecutor's function. It is a futher example of their confused 
thinking when it comes to criminal matters. 
In case after case prosecutors are reminded that their 
duty is not conviction but to see that justice is done. In 
Berqer v. United statesr 55 S,Ct. 629, 633 (1935) Justice 
Sutherland observed insofar as the United States Attorney's 
Office was concerned: 
The United States Attorney is the 
representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose 
obligation to govern impartially is as 
compelling as its obligation to govern at 
all; and whose interest, therefore, in a 
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win 
a case, but that justice shall be done. As 
such, he is in a peculiar and very definite 
sense the servant of the law, the two-fold 
aid of which is that guilt shall escape or 
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with 
earnestness and vigor - indeed he should do 
so. But while he may strike hard blows he is 
not at liberty to strike foul ones. 
Justice Sutherland's observation is no less true of a 
state prosecutor whether he be an employee of the Attorney 
General's Office or of a County Attorney. 
The Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically 
Ethical Considerations 7-13, also reminds the public prosecutor 
of his duties and responsibilities: 
The responsibility of a public 
prosecutor differs from that of the usual 
advocate; his duty is to seek justice not 
merely to convict. This special duty exist 
because; (1) the prosecutor represents the 
sovereign and therefore should use restraint 
in the discretionary exercise of governmental 
powers, such as in the selection of cases to 
prosecute; (2) the prosecutor represents the 
sovereign and therefore should use restrain 
in the discretionary exercise of governmental 
powers, such as in the selection of cases to 
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prosecute; (3) during trial the prosecutor is 
not only an advocate but he also may make 
decisions normally made by an individual 
client, and those effecting the public 
interest should be fair to all; and (4) in 
our system of criminal justice the accused is 
to be given the benefit of all reasonable 
doubts. With respect to evidence and 
witnesses the prosecutor has a 
responsibilities different from those of a 
lawyer in private practice: the prosecutor 
should make timely disclosure to the defense 
of available evidence known to him that tends 
to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate 
the degree of the offense, or reduce the 
punishment. Further, a prosecutor should not 
intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence 
merely because he believes it will damage the 
prosecutor's case or aid the accused. 
Overreaching on the part of a prosecutor is counter to 
his own interest because it can result in severe sanctions, 
including the dismissal of his case. 
When looked at in a true light the respondents' 
arguments built as they are on the notation that the possibility 
exists that the Subpoena Powers Act will be abused because of the 
dangerous proclivity of public prosecutors to violate the rights 
of citizens at will without penalty or fear of consequence, and 
on their belief that because the Act does not specifically spell 
out or incorporate the limitations on investigations and 
prosecutions that exist independent of the Act, it is somehow 
defective, are truly transparent. 
B. 
Respondents Utah Power and Light Company (UP&L) also 
argue that section 77-22-2 should be declared unconstitutionally 
vague. UP&L relies on KPlentier, supra, and cites Smith v. 
Goguen. 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (involving Massachusetts General 
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Laws Annotated c. 264, section 5, a flag mis-use statute making 
it punishable by a fine of not less than ten nor more than one 
hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or 
both, for anyone to publically mutilate, trample upon, defame or 
treat contemptously the flag of the United States.) , and Grayned 
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (involving two Rockford, 
Illinois city ordinances. One, an anti-picketing ordinance, 
punished as disorderly conduct picketing or demonstrating on a 
public within 150 feet of a primary or secondary school in 
session. The other.. anti-noise ordinance, made it a crime for 
anyone to "willfully make or assist in the making of any noise or 
diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace and good 
order" of a school or class in session), in support of the 
proposition that penal statutes are not favored constitutionally 
when they lack the specificity necessary to prevent those who 
enforce them from having too great a latitude in determining what 
is or isn't the conduct prohibited by the statute. It is obvious 
in every case that the Supreme Court was talking about 
substantive criminal statutes, not statutes involving criminal 
procedure or, as in this case, statutes giving the government 
nothing more than investigative devices to use in detecting 
crime. They have no application in analyzing the Subpoena Powers 
Act a statute that makes nothing criminal. 
UP&L acknowledges the weakness in their argument by 
admitting the distinction between this case and the cases they 
rely on as authority. 
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UP&L's assertion that Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-2 gives 
prosecutors "carte blanche" to set their own standards for 
criminal procedure thus making it unconstitutionally vaguef is 
not supported by the language of the Act, the history of its use 
or, common sense. The Subpoena Powers Act does contain 
procedural requirements that are spelled out clearly on the face 
of the statute; in order for the Attorney General or a county 
attorney to make use of the Acthe must first file an affidavit in 
the District Court in sufficient detail to allow that court to 
determine whether good cause exists to authorize the use of the 
subpoena power in furtherance of his investigation. Once 
authorized, the Attorney General or county attorney must still 
issue subpoenas to specific people for enumerated items or 
evidence. The District Court has inherent authority to grant 
equitable relief, that is to quash subpoenas if compliance 
therewith would be unreasonable. The court that authorizes the 
use of the subpoenaes under section 77-22-2 can, if it chooses, 
there being nothing in this statute to prevent it, monitor the 
investigation on its motion and at will. 
The Court that authorizes the use of subpoenas under 
Section 77-22-2 can, if it chooses, there being nothing in the 
statute to prevent it, monitor the investigation on its own 
motion and at will. The Attorney General and County Attorneys do 
not, therefore, have the unlimited or unfettered control over the 
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process permitted by the Subpoena Powers Act, that Utah Power and 
Light would like the Court to think they have. There simply is 
no "carte blanche." This proceeding is ample evidence of that 
point. The Subpoena Powrs Act is no more dangerous than the 
search warrant provisions of the Act. Every procedural safeguard 
available in the case of a search warrant both before and after 
its execution, including prior review by a magistrate, is 
available in the case of an investigative subpoena before 
anyone's rights are ever put in jeopardy. The review by a 
magistrate can be accomplished on a motion to quash any subpoena 
issued under authority of the Act. The statute and those who use 
it simply are not the boogie man respondents fear. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO STRICT PROHIBITION AGAINST THE 
USE OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN A CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATION IN A COMPANION CIVIL ACTION. 
The prohibition against the automatic disclosure of 
matters occurring before a federal grand jury for use in civil 
actions that was announced by the United States Supreme Court in 
United SUtgs v. Sells Engineering, 103 S.Ct. 3133 (1983), and 
the prohibition against disclosing matters occurring before a 
federal grand jury solely for the purpose of determining a 
target's civil liability, United States v. Bagqott, 103 S.Ct. 
3164 (1983), is limited in application to matters arising under 
Rule 6, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a provision which 
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has no counterpart in Utah criminal practicer and is restricted 
in any case to matters involving grand juries. Those cases have 
no application in the matter before this Court. 
Respondent Utah Power and Light states that it is the 
general rule that "evidence gathered in a criminal investigation 
cannot be used for civil enforcement." (UP&L brief p. 47) Emery 
Mining assumes that proposition when it argues that the Subpoena 
Powers Act contains no standards to prohibit the improper use of 
evidence gathered in criminal investigations. (Emery brief pp. 
23-24) Both rely on federal cases arising under Rule 6(a), 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as authority for that 
proposition. 
Rule 6(e), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, is an 
elaborate set of restrictions and requirements associated with 
the recording of and disclosure of proceedings and matters 
occurring before federal grand juries. It has no counterpart in 
Utah law. Utah Code Ann. § 77-11-9(4), (5), (6) and Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-11-10 deal with the secrecy requirements imposed in 
Utah grand jury proceedings but in none of the detail contained 
in Rule 6(e). There is no provision for disclosure of matters 
occurring before grand juries on a showing of particularized 
need, for example. 
The most recent and most important cases dealing with 
the use of matters occurring before a federal grand jury in civil 
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cases are United States v. Sells Engineerngr cited by Emery 
Mining, and its companion case, United States v. Baggott. supra. 
While Emery would have the court believe that Sells is authority 
for the proposition that evidence obtained by a federal grand 
jury may never be used in civil actions, neither Sells nor 
Baggott say anything of the sort. In Sells, supra, the Supreme 
Court simply forbade the automatic disclosure of grand jury 
materials allowed under Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i). Disclosure to 
justice department civil division attorneys could be had, 
however, under Rule 6 (e)(3) (C)(i), that is, when directed by a 
court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial 
proceeding, on a showing of particularized need. Id., 3144-3149. 
In Baggottf the Supreme Court merely held that an IRS 
tax audit was not preliminary to or in connection with a judicial 
proceeding within the meaning of Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) and therefore 
disclosure of grand jury materials to the IRS could not properly 
be ordered. Id., 3166-3169. Nowhere in the language of either 
case is there a statement of the general rule postulated by Utah 
Power and Light and Emery. Indeed, in addition to 
misinterpreting Sells and the other cases they cite on this 
point, respondents miss the critical significance of these cases: 
they involve grand juries, federal grand juries specifically. 
None of the cases cited control in any way the conduct of affairs 
under the Subpoena Powes Act. 
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Utah Power and Light's statement that "it is beyond 
dispute that there are extraordinary instances in which limited 
information from a criminal investigation properly may be 
authorized to be used in a civil action/1 (UP&L brief, p. 48) 
goes much too far. It goes much further than Sells, supra, or 
Baggott, supra, permit. Nothing in either of the cases applies 
to criminal investigations generally as Utah Power and Light's 
statement boldly implies. Only when a federal grand jury is 
involved does the structure described by Rule 6(e) and 
interpreted by ££UL£r supra, and Baggott, supra, and the other 
federal cases cited by respondents, have any meaning. Evidence 
obtained by federal criminal investigators independent of a grand 
jury even if presented to a grand jury after it is collected, can 
be disclosed and used in civil cases without consequences. See 
In re Grand Jucy_Matter (Garden COiJrt Nosing BQTOfci IncJ, 6 97 
F.2d 511, 516 (3d Cir. 1982) (Garth, J., concurring) ("when 
testimony or data is sought for its own sake—for its intrinsic 
value in furtherance of a lawful investigation—rather than to 
learn what took place before the grand jury, it is not a valid 
defense to disclosure that the same information is revealed to a 
grand jury or that the same documents had been, or were presently 
being, examined by a grand jury.'1); United States iu~In£&LSl£te 
Dress Carriers, Inc., 280 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1960); SEC v. 
Dresser Industries Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1383 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 
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In re Grand Jury Investigation (New Jersey state Commission of 
Investigation) . 630 F.2d 996, 1000 (3d Cir. 1980) , cert. d£H. 449 
u.s. 1081 (1981); United States v, Stanford, 589 F.2d 285f 291 
(7th Cir. 1978), cert. d£u. 440 U.S. 983 (1979); In re Grand Jury 
Matter (Catania). 682 F.2d 61, 64 (3d Cir. 1982); In re Grand 
Jury Investigation (Lance), 610 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1980); In re 
Special April 1977 Grand Jury, 587 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1978); £££ 
v. Everest Management Corporation. 87 F.R.D. 100, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980). 
Furthermore, Utah Power and Light's statement that: 
. . . the use of such evidence [evidence 
obtained in a criminal investigation] is 
permitted only after a showing of 
particularized need which necessarily 
means the practice is not favored, . . . 
(UP&L brief, pp. 48-49). 
is meaningless unless it refers solely to the disclosure of 
matter occurring before a grand jury as authorized by Rule 6(e), 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Certainly, as discussed above, disclosure of evidence 
obtained outside the grand jury for use in any way seen fit by 
the government, including civilly, is not forbidden or unusual or 
disfavored. The statement has no origin in state law. It has no 
meaning insofar as Utah grand juries are concerned. None of 
Utah's grand jury statutes say anything about disclosure on 
particularized need. It is most significant that the statement 
has no application at all when it comes to matter obtained or 
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gathered as a result of a state criminal investigation conducted 
without the aid of a grand jury. While the secrecy provisions of 
the Subpoena Powers Act have some of the trappings associated 
with grand juries, an investigation conducted using the devices 
allowed by the Act, is, simply stated, not a grand jury 
investigation or a grand jury proceeding. The secrecy that can 
be ordered by a court for the purposes set out in the Act is not 
the secrecy required of grand jury proceedings in Utah. The 
State contends that any order imposed by a district court 
pursuant to § 77-22-2(3) can be lifted by that court for any 
reason not forbidden by the statute, including so that evidence 
obtained in the criminal investigation might be used in civil 
proceedings. 
Analogizing the conduct of affairs under the Act to the 
conduct of a grand jury investigation is illustrative, not 
controlling. It is helpful for this Court to look at cases and 
statutes dealing with the rights of targets before state grand 
juries or before federal grand juries for guidance in enumerating 
what warnings or protections must be afforded those subpoenaed or 
required to produce evidence pursuant to the Subpoena Powers Act 
Similarly, cases dealing with the scope of grand jury criminal 
investigations are illustrative of how far investigators might go 
with the tools the Act gives them. The Court is not, however, 
bound by any rule or statute governing the grand jury when 
interpreting Section 77-22-1, et seq. 
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Calling the statute Utah's "Mini Grand Jury Act" was 
convenient for the Court in KUTV v, Conderr 635 P.2d 412 (1981) 
but was mistaken. The Subpoena Powers Act does not create a mini 
grand jury in any sense of the word. It merely authorizes the 
use of subpoenas to compel production and testimony in aid of 
criminal investigations. The act should not be tied to the 
statutes governing Utah grand juries simply because at one point 
in time a court felt it useful to tag it with the misnomerf "Mini 
Grand Jury Act." 
The evidence obtained by use of the subpoenas 
authorized by the Subpoena Powers Act, is not for any reason 
articulated by any of the respondents foreclosed from use in 
civil proceedings brought before, contemporaneous with, or after 
the filing of criminal charges in this case, regardless of 
whether the same attorneys are involved in both the civil and 
criminal cases. If, perhaps, the cases had been brought in 
federal court and the evidence used to obtain an indictment from 
a grand jury was developed using the grand jury, the propriety of 
using the same evidence in a companion civil case or the wisdom 
of employing the same attorneys to do both the civil and criminal 
cases would be at issue under the rules of iLelLs, supra, and 
Baggott. supra, but that is not the case. The law governing the 
federal grand jury does not apply in this case. State law does 
not prohibit what has been done. No reason that can be found in 
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state or federal constitutional law prohibits what was done. 
Respondents simply have no authority for their position that the 
act is either defective in some way because it does not forbid 
the use of evidence obtained by subpoena under the Act in 
companion civil cases or because the act was abused in some way 
because evidence that was subsequently used in a companion civil 
case came into the hands of criminal investigators involved in a 
criminal investigation through. 
POINT IV 
THOSE SUBPOENAED UNDER THE AUTHORITY GRANTED 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND COUNTY ATTORNEYS 
PURSUANT TO THE SUBPOENA POWERS ACT NEED NOT 
BE AFFORDED THE SAME PROTECTION ALLOWED THOSE 
SUBPOENAED TO APPEAR BEFORE A UTAH GRAND 
JURY. 
A. The State contends that the Subpoena Powers Act is 
not a grand jury statute. It provides the Attorney General and 
the County Attorneys with an investigative tool; the 
investigative subpoena. There is no greater reason to require 
that witnesses subpoenaed under the Act be afforded anything more 
in terms of constitutional protection than other witnesses 
involved in a criminal matter or suspects or targets of ordinary 
criminal investigations. The magic attributed to the grand jury 
by respondents does not exist in reality. The grand jury is not 
the ,,buffer,, respondents would like this court to believe it is. 
Practically speaking, the target of a criminal investigation 
conducted in part as authorized by the Subpoena Powers Act, who 
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becomes a defendant in a criminal information filed on evidence 
developed through the use of subpoenas obtained under Section 77-
22-2 is probably better protected by the preliminary examination 
required by Rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, than he 
would ever be as a defendant under indictment returned by a state 
grand jury. Respondents fail to acknowledge that following a 
grand jury indictment, there is no intervening protection for an 
accused before trial. 
The logical end of respondents' arguments about the 
adequacy of protection afforded a target of an investigation 
under the Subpoena Powers Act to compel appearance and the 
production of documents and other evidence is that trial by 
information would be improper and forbidden in any case because 
the protection afforded those charged by information and those 
indicted is not precisely the same. Everyone would have to be 
tried on indictment. Grand juries would be required in every 
case. That they reach this conclusion is not surprising, since 
they misinterpret the Subpoena Powers Act to allow an 
"accusatory" process. 
We know, however, that prosecution by information in 
Utah is constitutional. Maxwell v. Dow. 19 Utah 495, 57 P. 412, 
affirmed 176 U.S. 581, 44 L.Ed. 597, 20 S.Ct. 448 (1900). There 
is no due process or equal protection problem in trial by 
information. There is no adequate reason articulated by 
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respondents that investigation conducted with the help of 
investigative subpoenas rather than should fare differently in 
constitutional analysis than investigation conducted by a grand 
jury pursuant to its subpoena power. 
The need to warn one that he is a target of an 
investigation has roots not so much in grand jury practice, but 
in the notions of voluntariness, knowledge and the intelligent 
exercise of one's constitutional rights in the face of the 
government's efforts to detect and punish crime. Concededly, 
these warnings must be given when required in order for the 
evidence obtained thereby to be of any value at all in subsequent 
proceedings. They would be required, of course, whenever the 
issue of the voluntary, intelligent or knowing waiver of a 
constitutionally protected right was at stake. Warning one that 
he is a target of an investigation is of some benefit in that 
regard. Advising a witness of his right to have counsel with him 
is also helpful. Disclosing to the target the nature of the 
charges being investigated might also be necessary to insure that 
voluntary, intelligent and knowing waivers occurred. Whether 
full blown Miranda warnings ought to be given or whether anything 
more or less would be acceptable ought to depend on the 
circumstances in each case. For those who are not targets of an 
investigation, warnings are essentially meaningless. For those 
who are targets at the time they produce the evidence or are 
-35-
compelled to provide statements, the warnings guarantee that they 
are on notice of what is at stake for them. For those who become 
targets after having produced protected or privileged information 
whether disclosures or admissions or other vital and protected or 
privileged material were made or delivered up voluntarilyf 
intelligently or without adequate notice and knowledge under the 
circumstances can be determined on motions to suppress the 
evidence if the target becomes a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding in which the prosecution seeks to use the items and 
information furnished as evidence against the defendant. 
There is simply no compelling reason and no reason 
articulated by the respondents for carving out special rules 
relating to warnings or targets insofar as the Subpoena Powers 
Act is concerned. Again, the analogy of the Act to a Utah State 
grand jury need not be taken to absurd extremes. 
The differences between the grand jury process and the 
process of investigation under the Subpoena Powers Act also shows 
the fallacy in Emery's argument that the Act violates separation 
of powers principles. Besides the fact that this argument was 
never raised in the district court, the Act does not convert the 
prosecutor into an extension of the functions of the judicial 
branch of government. The Act is simply a tool to allow 
investigation of crime, following which the prosecutor may decide 
to file criminal charges - both of which are proper functions of 
the executive branch of government. 
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POINT V. 
THIS COURT CAN REQUIRE THAT THE SUBPOENA 
POWERS ACT BE USED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT 
WITH RIGHTS THAT EXIST INDEPENDENT OF THE 
STATUTE. 
Colby, Stott and Maxfield contend that the Act is 
defective because its specific language does not require 
investigators to warn or advise witnesses or targets of rights 
already granted them or already guaranteed them under the 
Constitution as interpreted by the courts. In order to accept 
their argument, one must concede that a statute, particularly one 
like the Act, has to incorporate in its language all of the 
protection already available to suspects or witnesses in ordinary 
criminal investigations under both the state and federal 
constitutions and cases like Miranda, Escobedo, and the like. 
Respondents cite no authority for that proposition. Indeed, to 
require that to occur before a statute can be found adequate 
would not only be unnecessary but would involve an incredible 
waste of time and effort. The simple answer, is to allow the Act 
to be read side by side with Miranda and every other case or 
statute that might apply as the circumstances warrant. 
No authority cited by any of the respondents requires 
that a statute incorporate in its language every right one might 
exercise or be entitled to in relation to a statute's use or 
application. 
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Nothing in any of the respondents1 briefs suggests that 
this court lacks the power to interpret the Act in light of 
rights which exist independent of the statute. The respondents, 
in fact, ask the Court on nearly every page of their briefs to 
read the Act in light of established constitutional principles 
and individual rights. This Court can, the State contends, 
assure constitutional application of the Subpoena Powers Act by 
instructing those who will be using its provisions on the rights 
and privileges which must be protected or observed in its 
application. By doing so, it is not adding what the legislature 
left out or redrafting the statute in any way. A reading of the 
statute reveals no prohibition against advising one that he is a 
target of an investigation. Though the statute does not require 
same, in specific language, none of the authorities cited by the 
respondents, none of their arguments, and none of their reasoning 
suggests that the Court could not determine that in order for 
anyone who is a target of an investigation which uses subpoenas 
obtained under Section 77-22-2 to compel testimony or the 
production of evidence, to act voluntarily, knowingly or 
intelligently he must be given notice that he is a target and be 
advised of what other rights the court believes are necessary for 
that to happen. Nothing prohibits the court from suggesting 
sanctions if the warnings are not given just like the Supreme 
Court did in the case of custodial police interrogation in 
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Miranda. Nothing is being added to the statute. The Subpoena 
Powers Act is not being rewritten, nor is its language being 
interpreted. The statute is simply being read by the court in 
light of and in the context of the already existing body of 
criminal and constitutional law. That is precisely the function 
of this Court. Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah, 1974), 
cited by Colby, Stott and Maxfield, is precisely on point: the 
Subpoena Powers Act should not be determined unconstitutional 
because a sensible interpretation of in the context suggested 
does allow it some practical effect. Likewise, the Act is 
entitled to the presumption of validity precisely because it can 
be read as suggested. 
POINT VI 
THE SUBPOENA POWERS ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE 
"ONE SUBJECT1' PROVISION OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
Respondents Maxfield, Stott, and Colby through their 
counsel Donald B. Holbrook, have suggested that the Subpoena 
Powers Act violates Article VI, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution. This section provides in part: l". . . Except 
general appropriation bills and bills for the codification and 
general revision of laws, no bill shall be passed containing more 
than one subject. . . .H 
Respondents fail to point to any portion of the Act 
which they claim violates the foregoing provision or even to 
explain why the cited Constitutional provision is applicable. 
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Further, Judge Bunnell's ruling holding the Act 
unconstitutional makes absolutely no reference to the Act being 
defective for the reasons which respondents, Maxfield, Stott and 
Colby suggest. Neither these respondents nor any others ever 
suggested that this constitutional provision had any application 
to the Subpoena Powers Act. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondents simply do not want to be investigated 
regardless of the means imployed. They fear the traditional 
means of challenging criminal evidence, that is, the suppression 
hearing, even though available to them if or when they are 
charged with criminal conduct, because they cannot articulate, 
indeed have not articulated in any of their pleadings or 
arguments, in any but the most sweeping and general terms, how 
they are improperly affected by the use of means provided under 
the Act or by the information or evidence sought pursuant to the 
subpoenas. Likewise, they have not and cannot articulate for 
this Court why the ordinary means of protecting people from 
investigative or prosecutorial abuse, that is, the quashal of 
subpoenas, the exclusion of evidence, the dismissal of an 
indictment or information because of prosecutorial abuse, or 
other sanctions based on the abuse of the power of the 
prosecutor, will not work if they succeed in showing that such 
abuse has occurred in this or in any other case. Because they 
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are unable to do any of this, they obfuscate and confuse the 
issues with irrelevant analysis. As discussed in this response, 
the simple analysis of the Subpoena Powers Act is the best and 
the most appropriate in this case. It is not and never was 
designed to be a grand jury statute. The requirements imposed on 
grand jury proceedings do not apply. The protection of those 
identified as targets of criminal investigations which use the 
tools given them by the Act do not have their origin and are not 
grounded in the rights afforded those who are witnesses before or 
targets of a grand jury investigation but are founded in the 
basic principles of due process, that is to say, those who are 
identified as targets of investigations before they can 
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waive any right against 
self incrimination, or waive any right to have counsel present or 
waive any other constitutionally protected right must be advised 
of their target status and given whatever other information under 
the circumstances is necessary to put them on adequate notice. 
The State concedes that that must be done when 
appropriate. It is not, however, in the State1s view, 
appropriate in every case of every witness subpoenaed pursuant to 
Selction 77-22-1. To require that would destroy the 
effectiveness of the investigation, would be burdensome, would be 
unnecessary, and would serve absolutely no purpose. To disclose 
anything more than the charges or the nature of the charges being 
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investigated would be an unreasonable imposition on those 
conducting the investigation and would jeopardize the integrity 
of the investigation by permitting those who are so inclined to 
tamper with evidence, obstruct justice, or collaborate on stories 
to confuse, misdirect or divert the attention of an ongoing 
investigation. The secrecy provisions provided by the 
legislature in 77-22-2(3) are designed precisely to avoid that 
result, and as well, to protect those who are innocent of 
criminal wrongdoing from public aprobrium. 
The remedies available in case of abuse are plentiful 
and are adequate to deal with all of the problems identified by 
respondents in their briefs. 
The simple fact as far as is that the Act does not 
suffer from constitutional or legal deficiencies. It, like any 
other statute, can and probably will at some time in the future 
be applied in a way that might violate someone's rights. The 
fact that it might be abused or that it will be abused or that it 
has been abused or that the authority granted pursuant to it has 
been abused does not logically, legally or any other way require 
a conclusion that the statute is legally or constitutionally 
defective. What it does do is require an analysis of the 
remedies available to correct abuse. As stated, those remedies 
as exist are adequate. That can be taken up by criminal 
defendants charged with criminal offenses in hearings, the 
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purpose of which is to examine specific evidence and determine 
whether it should be suppressed because a showing is made that 
rights were violated that should have been observed or protected, 
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